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I. Introduction
I will address the Securities and Exchange Commission's efforts to inves-
tigate misconduct within the U.S. capital markets whether originating in the
U.S. or abroad and to prosecute violations of the securities laws. My focus
is on the efforts we employ in investigations and litigation when confronted
by foreign secrecy or blocking laws. I will state the principles the commis-
sion follows when policing the internationalized capital markets; comment
on the fairness of our marketplace and the commission's mandate to insure
that the U.S. securities markets operate with an integrity that justifies inves-
tor confidence; discuss the accelerating internationalization of the U.S. cap-
ital markets and the problems which U.S. law enforcement encounters
because of foreign laws which restrict discovery; describe the methods by
which the commission may seek production of evidence; and explore
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approaches which may resolve the difficulties the commission encounters in
obtaining evidence when confronted by secrecy or blocking laws.
11. Principles for Policing Markets
The U.S. securities markets are a vital resource. The commission's man-
date is to preserve the integrity of those markets. Illegal conduct in our
capital markets, whether initiated in the U.S. or abroad, threatens vital eco-
nomic interests of the U.S. While the commission is respectful of all
nations' sovereignty, the preservation of the fairness of the U.S. markets is
essential.
When secrecy or blocking laws impede the Commission's enforcement
efforts, our immediate response is consultation rather than confrontation.
Where possible, rather than resort to litigation we seek private discussions
with foreign government officials to obtain needed information. But the
private consultations must be swift and productive to be effective.
Where a violation of our laws has occurred, the U.S. sovereign interest in
prosecuting the violators must not be frustrated. Before a Commission
investigation confronts secrecy or blocking laws, U.S. national interests
have already been adversely affected. If private consultations with foreign
government officials to obtain evidence are not productive, confrontation
by means of litigation is generally the commission's only recourse. Unfor-
tunately, litigation creates strained relationships with foreign governments.
A less aggressive law enforcement policy would be to accept a de facto
double standard - two sets of law enforcement rules: one standard for
those trading from within the U.S. and a lesser standard for those trading
from beyond our borders. For any nation to have a double standard of law
enforcement would make a mockery of its efforts to enforce its laws and
protect the integrity of its capital markets for all investors. No nation which
endorses equal protection of its laws can tolerate such inequity.
These principles for policing our markets will not discourage investment
in the U.S. markets. Indeed, by the commission following these policies we
help preserve the integrity of our markets which encourages investment in
the U.S.
A. The Commission's Mandate
The U.S. has the broadest, most active and most efficient capital markets
in the world. I They are broad, efficient and liquid largely because investors
have confidence that they are fair. Investors, whether they reside in the
U.S. or abroad, depend upon this fairness. It is essential to capital forma-
tion and to economic growth.
'Address by John S.R. Shad, chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Confer-
ence Board of New York (Oct. 13, 1982).
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Increasingly, foreign individuals, enterprises and financial institutions are
investing in the U.S. markets because of their integrity and promise of eco-
nomic growth. The commission's mandate is to insure that those markets
continue to operate with an integrity that justifies such confidence.
B. Internationalization of the Securities Markets
We are in the midst of rapid internationalization of the securities mar-
kets. The capital markets of each nation are increasingly affected by trans-
actions initiated outside its borders. Foreign participation in the U.S.
securities markets has increased dramatically. From 1978 to 1982,
purchases in the U.S. by foreign persons or financial institutions involving
stocks and bonds increased from $23.6 billion to $53.1 billion. Total for-
eign investment in the U.S. increased from $25.6 billion in 1971, to $42.4
billion in 1978, and to $99.2 billion in 1982.2
The U.S. markets also are an important source of capital for foreign
nations. At the end of 1982, 250 foreign issuers and twelve foreign govern-
ments had securities registered with the commission. From November 1982
to May 1983, the first six months after the commission instituted a short
form registration statement, eleven foreign companies registered $1.2 bil-
lion in offerings with the commission.
The capital markets of many nations are growing rapidly. International
access to these markets is expanding. It soon may be possible to trade many
securities twenty-four hours a day as a result of improved international
communications and the growth of securities markets around the world.
The internationalization of the securities markets will continue to increase.
The increased trading activity will undoubtedly expand the opportunity for
fraud. Unless nations can develop cooperative enforcement methods to
deal with such illegality, the fairness of all markets will be impaired.
III. Secrecy and Blocking Laws:
Problems for U.S. Enforcement
The internationlization of the U.S. capital markets has been accompa-
nied by a rise in securities transactions in the U.S. from jurisdictions which
have secrecy or blocking laws.3 I am not implying that all of the transac-
tions from those jurisdictions are fraudulent. However, because their laws
impede, and sometimes foreclose, the commission's ability to police U.S.
markets, they are attractive to wrongdoers whose conduct threatens the fair-
2 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY BULLETIN 106-
09 (Winter 1983); 42 SEC MONTHLY STATISTICAL REV. No. 2, 5 (Feb. 1983).3Secrecy laws are confidentiality laws which prohibit the disclosure of business records or
the identity of bank customers. Blocking laws prohibit the disclosure, copying, inspection or




ness of our system. I am not proposing the extraterritorial application of
U.S. laws or threatening the sovereignty of other nations. Indeed, the oppo-
site is true. It is the extraterritorial application of foreign laws which
impedes the commission's efforts to preserve the integrity of the U.S. securi-
ties markets. At issue is U.S. sovereignty and the commission's ability to
protect U.S. and foreign investors.
The U.S. Supreme Court has said that those who purposefully avail
themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within a state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, thereby submit to the juris-
diction of that state.4 This principle is consistent with international law.
Individuals or entities effecting transactions through foreign financial insti-
tutions on the U.S. securities markets engage in conduct with the U.S.
They make a deliberate decision to engage in conduct within the U.S. in
order to take advantage of the benefits of the U.S. markets.
A double standard of enforcement is unacceptable. The U.S. cannot give
preferential treatment to foreign investors. Why should the U.S., or any
nation, accord foreign investors a privilege of secrecy that it does not recog-
nize for its own citizens? Why should the U.S., or any nation, permit for-
eign investors to violate its laws with impunity while holding its citizens
accountable for violations of the same laws? The securities laws apply to
anyone engaged in conduct in the U.S. capital markets. Investors who
come into the U.S. and take advantage of our markets cannot expect the
protections of secrecy oi blocking laws to follow them.
It is unacceptable that the secrecy or blocking laws of one nation will
apply to a transaction that occurs within another nation. This would consti-
tute an extraterritorial application of the secrecy of blocking nation's laws.
As a result, investors who order a securities transaction to be effected
outside the borders of a secrecy or blocking law jurisdiction must be
regarded as leaving the protections of those laws behind. They cannot have
both the benefits of one nation's markets and of another nation's secrecy
laws. Under the circumstances, nations with secrecy or blocking laws
should not interpose themselves to frustrate the investigation and prosecu-
tion of persons who engage in fraudulent transactions in other countries.
All nations with securities markets are vulnerable to persons outside their
borders who seek to take advantage of investment opportunities while hid-
ing their activities behind secrecy or blocking laws. The danger is clear and
present. All will have to find ways to protect themselves against fraud com-
mitted by persons located abroad. The only way nations can protect their
residents is to require investors to abide by the rules of the market in which
they trade. Thus, I am not proposing a threat to the sovereignty of any
nation. Rather, recognition that the protections of secrecy or blocking laws
4Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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should not apply to transactions effected on another nation's soil would
provide a way for all nations to protect their sovereignty and vindicate their
interests.
A. Practical Examples.
Impediments to the Commission's Law Enforcement
Normally, when a suspicious transaction occurs, the commission's
enforcement staff requests trading records from the broker and customer
involved and takes testimony to determine whether illegal conduct has
occurred. Similar steps are taken when investigating the adequacy of cor-
porate disclosure. The following examples illustrate how the commission's
enforcement efforts are impeded by secrecy and blocking laws.
1. SECRECY LAW AND MARKET FRAUD HYPOTHETICAL
Suppose XYZ Corporation plans a tender offer for the shares of ABC
Corporation. Furthermore, suppose either an officer of XYZ or one of its
professional consultants violates U.S. securities law by misappropriating
material non-public information concerning the unannounced tender offer,
and places a purchase order for the securities of ABC on the U.S. market
through a bank in a secrecy jurisdiction. If the transaction had been con-
ducted through a U.S. brokerage firm, the firm would be obligated, as a
matter of law, to assist the commission in quickly identifying the individual
involved. However, because the transaction was effected in the U.S.
through a bank in a secrecy jurisdiction, the commission would be denied
access to the information necessary to determine whether a securities law
violation had occurred.
2. BLOCKING LAW AND DISCLOSURE FRAUD HYPOTHETICAL
Next, suppose the commission is investigating fraudulent financial disclo-
sures of a U.S.-based multinational corporation with a significant subsidi-
ary in a country with blocking laws. The commission's enforcement staff
has the legal mandate to subpoena the U.S. parent requesting production of
the foreign subsidiary's books. The U.S. parent would have a duty to com-
ply with the subpoena. If the records were in the U.S., our laws provide
that the staff could quickly obtain them. However, if the records were
maintained by the subsidiary in a country with blocking laws, regardless of
the company's obligations under U.S. law, the commission may be pre-
vented from obtaining the same documents it could routinely subpoena
from the U.S. offices of the corporation.
In the examples, the commission could initiate diplomatic or litigation
steps attempting to identify the customers or obtain records. If assets
remain in the U.S., the commission might seek a court order freezing those
assets. Furthermore, if the circumstances point to illegal activity, it might
Winter 1984
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elect to file a "John Doe" complaint naming the foreign institution which
conducted the trading as well as the "unknown purchaser." Thereafter, it
might file a motion in federal court to compel the foreign institution to
disclose the names of its customers or to produce the subpoenaed records.
The examples dramatize how secrecy and blocking laws jeopardize the
success of U.S. enforcement efforts. The citizens of most nations participate
in the U.S. markets; it is in no nation's interest to interfere with those
efforts.
IV. The Commission's Power to Investigate and
Seek Production of Evidence
The two hypotheticals are background for a discussion of the methods by
which the commission may seek production of evidence. I will discuss the
commission's subpoena power and service of investigative subpoenas; court
orders compelling discovery under rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; voluntary production of evidence; letters rogatory; the Hague
Conventions; and international initiatives, particularly the 1977 Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the U.S. and Switzerland
and the August 1982 Memoraridum of Understanding.
A. The Commission's Investigatory Powers
Under the securities laws, the commission is granted broad investigatory
powers to determine whether a securities violation has occurred, is occur-
ring or is about to occur. It has discretion to conduct such investigations as
it deems necessary, to subpoena witnesses, to require production of relevant
documents 5 and to invoke the aid of the federal district courts in the case of
contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena. 6
U.S. courts have said the commission's subpoena power is not limited to
witnesses and documents located within the U.S. In SEC v. Minas de
Artemisa, S.A. 7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a federal
'Securities Exchange Act § 21(b) (1934); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1976). Similar provisions are
found in other federal laws. See generally Securities Act § 19(b) (1933); 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)
(1976); Public Utilities Holding Company Act § 18(c) (1935); 15 U.S.C. § 79r(c) (1976); Trust
Indenture Act § 321(a) (1939); 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1976); Investment Advisors Act § 209(b)
(1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(b) (1976); Investment Company Act § 42(b) (1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
41(b) (1976).
6 Securities Exchange Act § 21(c) (1934); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1976). Similar provisions are
found in other federal laws. See generally Securities Act § 22(b) (1933); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(b)
(1976); Public Utilities Holding Company Act § 18(d) (1935); 15 U.S.C. § 79r(d) (1976); Trust
Indenture Act § 321(a) (1939); 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1976); Investment Advisors Act § 209(c)
(1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(c) (1976); Investment Company Act § 42(c) (1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
41(c) (1976).
7150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945); accord, Mines & Metals Corp. v. SEC, 200 F.2d 317 (9th Cir.
1952); see also Federal Maritime Commission v. De Smedt, 366 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 974 (1966).
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court can order a corporation subject to its jurisdiction to produce books
and records located in a foreign country. 8 Several cases have upheld the
authority of the commission and other U.S. law enforcement authorities to
obtain court orders requiring the production of documents and information
located abroad.9 The cases hold that persons or entities doing business in
the U.S., or otherwise submitting to the jurisdiction of the U.S., may be
required to provide testimony or produce documents in proceedings arising
from their conduct within the U.S.
B. Service of the Commission's Investigative Subpoena
Service of a commission subpoena upon a citizen or alien within the terri-
tory of the U.S. presents few obstacles. If service complies with the Com-
mission's Rules of Practice,' 0 neither the existence of in personam
'The court noted that:
The obligation to respond [to the subpoena] applies even though the person served may find
it necessary to go to some other place to obtain the documents required to be produced.
Congress having clothed the Commission with broad investigatory powers, we should be
slow to impute to it the purpose of creating a loophole for companies incorporated abroad
but which, like appellee, are actively doing business and peddling their securities in the
United States. 150 F.2d at 218.
'In the Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Marc Rich & Co. A.G., a Swiss
corporation, No. M-I 1-188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (order imposing sanctions following refusal by a
Swiss corporation and its wholly-owned American subsidiary to comply with subpoenas) affid,
707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (1lth Cir.
1982) (affirmed order enforcing grand jury subpoena served on a Miami branch of a Canadian
bank for documents held in a Bahamian branch, notwithstanding Bahamian bank secrecy
laws), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1983); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. Il1
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court order imposing sanction if Swiss bank continued to refuse to comply
with court ordered discovery); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981)
(affirmed order enforcing an Internal Revenue Service summons for documents held in Swit-
zerland by a Swiss subsidiary of an American firm, notwithstanding Swiss secrecy laws);
United States v. Carver, et al., Criminal No. 81-00342 (D.D.C. 1981) (international judicial
assistance granted by the Court of Appeals, Grand Cayman Islands, despite Grand Cayman
secrecy laws, including orders permitting inspection of documents and directing testimony;
United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirmed order enforcing a grand jury
subpoena served upon a Canadian citizen in the United States directing him to testify concern-
ing his activities as a managing director of a bank located in Grand Cayman despite Grand
Cayman bank secrecy laws), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
'"Rule 14(b) provides, in pertinent part:
(3) Service of subpoenas. Service of a subpoena upon a person named therein shall be
made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to such person. Delivery of a copy of the sub-
poena to a natural person may be made by handing it to the person; by leaving it at his office
with the person in charge thereof, or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous
place therein; by leaving it at his dwelling place or usual place of abode with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein; by mailing it by registered or certified mail
to him at his last known address; or by any method whereby actual notice is given to him
prior to the return date. When the person to be served is not a natural person, delivery of a
copy of the subpoena may be effected by handing it to a registered agent for service, or to
any officer, director, or agent in charge of any office of such person; by mailing it by regis-
tered or certified mail to such representative at his last known address; or by any method
whereby actual notice is given to such representative prior to the return date.
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jurisdiction nor the mode of a subpoena service can be challenged. In con-
trast, when a subpoena must be served overseas, service is difficult. In Fed-
eral Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson,I I
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals said there is a difference between
(i) service of a summons and complaint - which are principally intended
to provide a defendant with notice that a legal action has been commenced,
and (ii) service of an investigative subpoena to compel specific acts.' 2 The
courts said:
Given the compulsory nature of a subpoena, . subpoena service by direct
mail upon a foreign citizen on foreign soil, without warning to the officials of the
local state and without . . resort to established channels of international judi-
cial assistance, is perhaps maximally intrusive [with respect to the foreign state's
sovereignty]. 13
However, the court said direct service of a U.S. subpoena abroad does not
violate international law when a foreign nation consents to service of com-
pulsory process upon its nationals by signing an international convention.
The court also said that a nation may consent to a particular request for
service, and specify an appropriate procedural mechanism whereby the
serving nation's compulsory process may be served on its own citizens. '
4
The Saint-Gobain decision illustrates that U.S. courts and the U.S. Con-
gress are mindful of the need to respect the sovereignty of other nations.
C. Court Orders Compelling Discovery
After the enforcement staff concludes an investigation, the commission
may initiate a law enforcement action in a federal district court. The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern the conduct of such actions,
provide for broad discovery of testimony and evidence. Parties may dis-
cover any matter which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action. 15
(i) Whenever service is to be made upon a person who is represented in pending proceed-
ing by an attorney, the service may be made upon the attorney. 17 CFR § 201.14(b)(3)(i)
(1983).
"636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
21d. at 1310-13.
'Id. at 1313.
"4In footnote 69 the court stated:
[Dlirect service of American subpoenas abroad does not always violate international law.
A nation may give general consent to service of compulsory process upon its nationals by
another nation's government agencies by signing an international convention...
Alternatively, a nation may consent to a particular request for service, and specify an
appropriate procedural mechanism whereby the serving nation's compulsory process may
be served on its own citizens, thus minimizing the infringement upon its own sovereignty
caused by the service itself. Id. at 1313-14.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1),
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If there is effective service of a court subpoena, or if a document produc-
tion request is made, and the recipient refuses to comply, the commission
can seek a court order under rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to compel the requested production.' 6 If the order is disobeyed, the court
may impose sanctions which may include adverse findings, money fines or
contempt proceedings.
1. A RULE 37 EXAMPLE - SEC v. BANCA DELLA SVIZZERA ITALIANA
SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,17 (the "St. Joe" case), demonstrates
how the commission can use rule 37 to obtain discovery from foreign
financial institutions, despite the existence of secrecy laws. The case
involved transactions - through a Swiss bank with offices in the U.S. - in
the common stock of and call options for the common stock of St. Joe Min-
erals Corporation prior to the announcement of a take-over bid for that
corporation.
The commission issued a subpoena to Banca Della Svizzera Italiana
("BSI") for documents concerning the subject transactions. The subpoena
was served on a U.S.-based subsidiary of BSI. It refused to comply with the
request claiming compliance would violate the secrecy laws of Switzerland.
Thereafter, the commission, through the Departments of State and Justice
and Swiss government authorities, sought to use non-compulsory means to
learn the customers' identities. The efforts failed. Then the commission
filed a motion seeking to compel production of the requested information.
In November 1981, Judge Milton Pollack of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted the commission's motion. He
ordered BSI to either disclose its customers identities or risk sanctions.
Using section 40 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 18 Judge Pol-
lack analyzed and balanced the vital national interests at stake, the hard-
16FED. R. Civ. P. 37. For further discussion of rule 37, see generally 8 WRIGHT AND
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284.
'"92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965):
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they
may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required
by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states;
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person;
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other
state;
(d) the nationality of the persons; and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to
achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
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ship which would be imposed by the decision and the good faith of the
parties. He stated:
The strength of the United States interest in enforcing its securities laws to ensure
the integrity of its financial markets cannot seriously be doubted. That interest is
being thwarted by the use of foreign bank accounts.19
What concerned Judge Pollack and the commission was the double stan-
dard for enforcement of the securities laws which was being futhered by the
secrecy laws. He concluded that:
It would be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American
markets, violate American laws if they were indeed violated, withdraw profits
and resist accountability for itself and its principals for the illegality by claiming
their anonymity under foreign law. 20
Confronted with the judge's opinion and the possibility of substantial
fines, BSI obtained a waiver of the secrecy laws from its customer and pro-
duced the requested information. The rule 37 approach proved successful
in the St. Joe case. However, case-by-case litigation is not the comprehen-
sive approach which must be developed if the commission and its foreign
counterparts are to successfully contain the efforts of criminals who use
secrecy and blocking laws to mask their illicit activities. Unless potential
violators are deterred by the fear that their conduct will be promptly scruti-
nized, they will continue to use secrecy and blocking laws to hide the cir-
cumstances of fraudulent transactions and their identities.
2. THE MARC RICH CASE
U.S. courts are increasingly responsive to requests for aid by law enforce-
ment agencies. The most recent case illustrating this attitude concerns an
investigation of Marc Rich & Co., A.G., which has received considerable
publicity.2 1 In this case, the Marc Rich & Co., A.G. (a Swiss commodities
trading corporation) refused to comply with a grand jury subpoena duces
tecum requesting certain business records relating to crude oil transactions.
As a result, Federal District Court Judge Leonard B. Sand imposed fines,
froze assets and threatened to close a Marc Rich wholly-owned subsidiary
which does business in the state of New York. The fines amounted to
$50,000 for each day the company failed to comply with the court's order.
The district court's ruling was subsequently affirmed in the federal appel-
late court, and the application for a writ of certiorari was denied by the U.S.
Supreme Court. 22 Other recent cases have involved the Bank of Nova Sco-




'In the Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Marc Rich & Co. A.G., a Swiss
corporation, No. M-I 1-188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 3555 (1983).
2 2
1d.
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tia, Deutsche Bank A.G., and the Toyota Motor Company.23 The Wall
Street Journal reported on August 22, 1983:
Generally, U.S. courts avoid requiring companies to do anything that would vio-
late the company's home laws. But U.S. courts have increasingly ignored foreign
laws forbidding compliance with subpoenas when shown evidence of "bad faith"
by a company, or when they have found that U.S. interests outweigh a foreign
government's concerns. In the Bank of Nova Scotia case, for instance, a federal
appeals court in Atlanta said, "We aren't willing to emasculate the grand jury
process whenever a foreign nation attempts to block our criminal justice
system." 2
4
This trend is likely to continue. The Marc Rich case illustrates how far a
court will go to compel the production of evidence when a defendant is
doing business in the U.S. However, in the Marc Rich case, the U.S. has yet
to receive all of the documents requested. Unfortunately, when cooperative
avenues for document production are unavailable or unworkable, such liti-
gation often represents the only practical approach for U.S. authorities.
D. Voluntary Production
On infrequent occasions foreign enterprises, banks and individuals have
voluntarily produced evidence to the commission. Their cooperation is
often based upon an assessment of the publicity associated with litigation
and the risks of resisting the commission's process in court. However, when
secrecy or blocking jurisdictions are involved, the degree of voluntary coop-
eration the commission receives is minimal.
E. Letters Rogatory
The commission rarely makes formal requests by means of letters roga-
tory for assistance from a U.S. federal court to an appropriate foreign court.
Letters rogatory are of limited use. As is true with respect to rule 37
requests, a matter must be pending before a U.S. district court before letters
rogatory may be used. Most often, foreign cooperation is needed to com-
plete an investigation prior to commencing such a lawsuit. Finally, letters
rogatory may take considerable time, and there is no assurance that a for-
eign court can, or will, comply with the request.
F. The Hague Conventions
There are two Hague Conventions which may be of assistance to the
commission in cases involving foreign persons or entities. The convention
231n re Grand Jury Proceedings, U.S. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1381 (1lth Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3086 (1983); U.S. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 52 A.F.T.R. 2d 83-5752
(C.D. Cal. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings No. M82-2 Misc. June 10, 1982, W.D. Mich.2
"Taylor and Lowenstein, Court Decisions in Marc Rich Case to Help U.S. Pursue Foreign
Firms, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 17, col. 4.
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concerning "Service of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents" was done in
1965, and entered into force in the U.S. in 1969.25 Although in principle
the convention provides for the discovery of testimony and documents,
many of the signatories have conditioned their assent to the convention
with the reservation that no "pre-trial" discovery may take place. Others
have refused to grant any document production under the convention.
The convention concerning "Taking of Evidence Abroad" was completed
in 1970, and ratified by the U.S. in 1972.26 This convention can provide
assistance in obtaining evidence. However, given the nature of the commis-
sion's proceedings, it has been employed rarely.
G. International Initiatives
1. THE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATY WITH SWITZERLAND
The commission has not relied exclusively on litigation when confronted
by secrecy or blocking laws. It has sought to improve nation-to-nation law
enforcement cooperation. Members of the commission's staff assisted in the
negotiation of the 1977 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
with Switzerland.2 7 The treaty provides for assistance in (i) locating wit-
nesses, (ii) obtaining statements and testimony, and (iii) the production and
authentication of judicial and administrative documents. While the treaty
has served to deter the use of Swiss secrecy laws to conceal fraud in the
U.S., its benefits for securities enforcement have been limited. The treaty
may be used to overcome Swiss secrecy laws only where there is dual crimi-
nality, i.e., the conduct involved constitutes a criminal offense under the
laws of both the U.S. and Switzerland.
a. The Santa Fe Case
SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call
Options for the Common Stock of, Santa Fe International Corporation (the
"Santa Fe" case), involved purchases of common stock of and call options
for the common stock of the Santa Fe International Corporation immedi-
ately prior to the public announcement of a merger between Santa Fe and
the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.28 Various banks purchased Santa Fe
securities for their omnibus trading accounts and refused to divulge the
names of the principals for whom they engaged in the transactions. The
commission's complaint alleged that, between September 21 and October 1,




28No. 81 Civ. 6553 [WCC], (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See Securities Exchange Act Rel. Nos. 9484
and 9485 (Oct. 26, 1981).
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$384,206; the options could be exercised to purchase 300,000 shares of
Santa Fe common stock. The commission also alleged that the unknown
purchasers acquired 27,000 shares of Santa Fe securities at a cost of
$340,000. Following the announcement of a merger between Santa Fe and
KPC on October 5, 1981, the value of the option contracts increased by
$5,344,763 and the value of the securities increased by $335,000. All of the
shares and most of the option contracts were sold in the two-week period
following the announcement.
Since the case was filed on October 26, 1981, the commission has
attempted to determine the identities of the unknown purchasers. After
lengthy discussions with the defendants' counsel and the government of
Switzerland, a decision was made to apply for assistance pursuant to the
1977 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. The request was
made in March 1982. In January 1983, the Swiss Federal Tribunal denied
the requested assistance stating that the commission had not adequately
established that the alleged violative activity would have constituted a crim-
inal offense under Swiss law.29 Relying upon the opinion of the Federal
Tribunal, the commission believes it can make a case that such a violation
exists and has filed a second treaty request to learn the customers' identities.
While a motion to compel discovery in the Santa Fe case has been an
option, the commission recognizes that the 1977 Treaty represents a
landmark development in international law enforcement cooperation.
Accordingly, we have attempted to use this cooperative means for obtaining
information. We view the Santa Fe case as a test case to determine whether
the treaty procedures are workable. To date, the results have not been satis-
factory. Efforts to obtain information through the treaty have delayed the
litigation for eighteen months. When it takes over a year to receive infor-
mation, the commission's ability to pursue a case and vindicate U.S. inter-
ests is impaired. Moreover, while the treaty may provide a useful
mechanism for mutual assistance in some cases, it does not apply to all
cases in which the commission needs assistance.
b. The Memorandum of Understanding
In August 1982, after six months of consultations, the commission, on
behalf of the U.S. and Switzerland, executed a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) to supplement the 1977 Treaty. The MOU is a declaration
of intent which states the interest of both governments in making use of the
procedures for assistance established by the 1977 Treaty in connection with
investigations and enforcement actions conducted by the commission.
30
"Unpublished opinion of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, issued June 26, 1983.
"
0The Swiss-U.S. negotiations, the MOU and Convention XVI are discussed in Green, U.S.,
Switzerland.gree to Prosecute Inside Traders, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 1982, at 12. The MOU is
reprinted id. at 17-19.
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The MOU recognizes, however, that until an offense such as insider trading
is made criminal in Switzerland, the treaty mechanism will not be available.
It also reflects the fact that legislation to prohibit insider trading is under
consideration by the Swiss government. The MOU contains the results of
an exchange of opinions regarding the interpretation, application and oper-
ation of the treaty, including the understanding that the commission may
utilize the procedures established by the treaty to obtain evidence.
The governments also agreed in principle to exchange diplomatic notes
to facilitate application of the treaty in ancillary administrative proceedings
with respect to offenses covered by the treaty and relating to trading by
persons in possession of material nonpublic information. The diplomatic
notes would make clear that information and evidence obtained pursuant to
the treaty may be used by the commission in civil injunctive actions and
administrative proceedings, as well as in criminal prosecutions conducted
by the Department of Justice. The governments also agreed to consider
whether comparable diplomatic notes should be exchanged with respect to
other securities law offenses covered by the treaty.
c. Convention XVI
The MOU also contains understandings concerning a private agreement
among members of the Swiss Bankers' Association. This agreement, known
as Convention XVI,3 1 will be in effect for three years, or until Switzerland
enacts legislation with respect to insider trading. The convention creates a
mechanism for Swiss banks that effect securities transactions on the U.S.
markets to provide information to the commission in cases not covered by
the treaty which involve possible insider trading. Commission requests for
information will be made through the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters to a three-member Commission of
Inquiry (COI) appointed by the Swiss Bankers' Association. The COI will
examine commission requests to determine whether the subject matter
thereof is properly within its jurisdiction.32 The convention establishes cer-
tain thresholds regarding trading volume and price which, if met, shall sat-
isfy the COI that the conditions for application of Convention XVI are
3 Convention XVI is reprinted in Green, U.S., Switzerland Agree to Prosecute Inside Traders,
supra n. 30, at 19 and 27.
"Convention XVI is applicable "[i]f within 25 trading days prior to a public announcement
(announcement) of (A) a proposed merger, consolidation, sale of substantially all of an issuer's
assets or other similar business combination (Business Combination) or (B) the proposed
acquisition of at least 10 percent of the securities of an issuer by open market purchase, tender
offer or otherwise (Acquisition), a customer gives to a bank an order to be executed in the U.S.
securities markets for the purchase or sale of securities or put or call options for securities of
any company that is a party to a Business Combination or the subject of an Acquisition
(Company) .. "
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met.33 However, even if the volume and price criteria are not satisfied, the
convention may be applied where there are reasonable grounds for the
commission to make an inquiry seeking assistance.
34
If the COI determines that a transaction is subject to Convention XVI,
the COl will request that the bank involved submit for its review a detailed
report regarding the transaction. Upon receipt of the request from the COI,
the bank will freeze its customers' accounts up to the amount of the profit
realized in the transaction and inform the customer of the request. It must
then report certain information to the CO. Under most circumstances the
requested information will be provided to the commission. However, if the
customer did not order the purchases or sales that are the subject of the
commission's request, or the customer is not an insider under the definition
contained in the convention, 35 then the Swiss Federal Office for Police Mat-
ters will not transmit the bank's report to the commission. The commission
will instead receive a report as to why the conditions for transmitting the
information are not satisfied.
Swiss banks who trade in the U.S. markets have agreed to the provisions
of Convention XVI, and have either requested waivers of the protection of
the secrecy laws or put customers on notice that future orders to effect
"The commission must show that "(i) material price or volume movements have occurred
with respect to trading in the securities which are the subject of the Acquisition or Business
Combination during the twenty-five day period prior to its announcement or (ii) it has other
material indications that the transactions referred to . . . above were made in violation of
U.S. insider trading laws. The [COIl] shall be satisfied in all cases in which the daily trading
volume of such securities increased 50 percent or more at any time during the twenty-five
trading days prior to such announcement above the average daily trading volume of such
securities during the period from the ninetieth trading day to the thirtieth trading day prior to
such announcement or the price of such securities varied at least 50 percent or more during the
twenty-five trading days prior to such announcement. In all other cases, the [COI shall review
the information submitted by the SEC to decide whether it is reasonably satisfied that the SEC
has reasonable grounds to make the inquiry."
3 The MOU states:
The parties understand that these [price and volume] thresholds are set at high levels
because they are intended to define the circumstances under which the [COIl shall be satis-
fied that the SEC has reasonable grounds to make the request. In all other cases in which
the criteria are not met, the parties understand that the [COIl will be required to review the
information submitted by the SEC to decide whether it is reasonably satisfied that the SEC
has reasonable grounds to make a request. Accordingly, the parties understand that a fail-
ure by the SEC to meet the threshold criteria specified in the private Agreement shall not
result in any presumption that the SEC does not have reasonable grounds to make the
request for assistance under the terms of the private Agreement and this Memorandum of
Understanding.
"The definition of an insider contained in Convention XVI is as follows:
(a) a member of the board, an officer, an auditor or a mandated person of the Company or
an assistant of any of them; or (b) a member of a public authority or a public officer who in
the execution of his public duty received information about an Acquisition or a Business
Combination; or (c) a person who on the basis of information about an Acquisition or a
Business Combination received from a person described in . . . (a) or (b) above has been
able to act for the latter or to benefit himself from inside information.
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transactions in the U.S. will be deemed to constitute such a waiver. Con-
vention XVI will be terminated when Switzerland enacts a penal law con-
cerning the misuse of material non-public information. The treaty then will
be used for mutual law enforcement cooperation in cases involving such
conduct.
The MOU and Convention XVI are landmark achievements. They
demonstrate what can be accomplished by two nations in the area of
mutual law enforcement cooperation and provide an important vehicle for
the commission when investigating insider trading cases where Swiss
accounts have been utilized. The commission has developed an excellent
working relationship with representatives of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters. Their good faith
and commitment to finding a workable solution were essential to the suc-
cess of the consultations.
V. New Perspectives
While the Mutual Assistance Treaty and the MOU between the U.S. and
Switzerland provide means for combating those who utilize Swiss accounts
to circumvent the U.S. securities laws, they do not apply to all violations of
the securities laws. Moreover, they are only available when a particular
Swiss account is implicated in a transaction.
It is impractical for the commission to negotiate separate agreements with
each nation that has secrecy or blocking statutes since many nations offer
anonymity to investors for banking and financial transactions. Further,
rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which was employed in the
St. Joe case, can only be used on a case-by-case basis after a civil enforce-
ment action has been filed. This approach is cumbersome, and unavailable
during a commission investigation. The commission has considered pro-
posals to deal with this problem.36 However, none of the proposals provide
3 in the 1970s, the commission advocated a possible legislative solution to problems encoun-
tered in investigations involving foreign persons or entities by proposing an amendment to
section 21(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The proposal contemplated the imposi-
tion of sanctions upon the beneficial owners of securities purchased in the U.S. in the event
they did not provide the commission with needed information in response to a subpoena. The
sanctions contemplated could have been ordered and enforced within the U.S., thereby avoid-
ing jurisdictional conflicts with other nations.
The Walsh Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783 and 1784 (as amended in 1948 and 1968), may also
provide a model to remedy deficiencies in the proposal to amend section 21(c) of the Securities
Exchange Act. The Walsh Act authorizes the filing of a civil action in a federal court seeking
testimony and other evidence from U.S. nationals and residents who are found abroad.
Another approach is contained in proposed rule 17a-3(a) (9), see Securities Exchange Act
Rel. No. 1.2055, 8 S.E.C. Docket 1155, 41 F.R. 8075; Securities Exchange Act Release No.
13149, 11 S.E.C. Docket 1416, 42 F.R. 3312. The rule was not adopted because of the negative
public comments, but it has not been withdrawn. The proposed amendment would have
required, as a precondition to participation in U.S. securities markets, that those who act on
behalf of undisclosed principals establish in advance, by written agreement, their willingness
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the necessary framework for resolving the conflict among foreign jurisdic-
tions which exists.
The increased use of satellites and advances in telecommunications, the
growing use of advanced computers and the availability of rapid interna-
tional travel will continue the internationalization of the securities markets.
Each nation with securities markets will have to find workable means of
holding non-resident investors accountable for their conduct within its ter-
ritory. The growing interdependence of the securities markets also will
require greater cooperation among nations to assure that violations of law,
or other injuries caused by non-residents, can be redressed.
A. American Precedent
In searching for solutions, the experience of the U.S. in adapting to the
nationalization of its economy may be helpful. In the nineteenth century, it
was recognized that each state of the American Union possessed exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. 37
As a corollary, no state could exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property outside its territory. 38
This approach became unworkable when corporations began to do busi-
ness in more than one state. The states developed doctrines of express and
implied consent in order to obtain jurisdiction over non-residents and hold
them accountable for their conduct within the state. Many states enacted
laws requiring corporations to consent to be sued as a prerequisite to doing
business within their territory. In addition, the states often required that
such corporations have agents for service of process within the state. These
developments were based on the fact that a corporation incorporated in one
to disclose the identity of their principals in response to a commission request. Brokers and
dealers would have been required to obtain the agreement of financial institutions or other
persons authorized to effect transactions for the account that such persons will furnish the
name and address of the beneficial owners at the request of the commission.
The rules of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 17 C.F.R. §§ 2101 et seq.,
endorse another approach, which conditions access to the U.S. futures markets upon a willing-
ness to provide information in response to a specific request of the CFTC. The rules permit
the CFTC to issue "special calls" requesting information from futures commission merchants,
foreign brokers and members of the contract markets. The rules require that futures commis-
sion merchants provide the name, address and certain information concerning the holder, or
beneficial holder, of an open futures contract, in response to such a special call. Id. at § 2101.
When a futures commission merchant or a customer refuses to comply with a special call, the
CFTC can prohibit the contract market involved, and all futures commission merchants and
foreign brokers, from executing or accepting any order for trades on that contract market or
for the specific contracts in question (except for trades closing out the positions involved). Id.
at § 2103.
"See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977).
"Id. at 197 and 199.
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state may transact business within another state only with the latter's
consent.
39
Following the development of the automobile, states enacted laws pro-
viding that a non-resident's operation of a motor vehicle within their terri-
tory would constitute the appointment of a state official as his or her agent
for service of process.40 A Massachusetts statute authorized such service of
process in court actions growing out of any accident or collision in which a
non-resident might be involved while operating a motor vehicle within the
state. 4' Express consent was unnecessary. Rather, consent was implied by
operation of law from the person's decision to enter a state and operate a
motor vehicle.
International law and the law of jurisdiction give the U.S. jurisdiction to
inquire into the circumstances of all transactions effected in the U.S. securi-
ties markets, including those initiated from abroad, and to pursue any court
action that might arise out of such transactions. 4 2 In addition, there are
internationally accepted means of obtaining service of process.43 However,
the cases suggest - by analogy - that the U.S. could require the master of
a secret under foreign law, who effects transactions in the U.S. markets
from abroad, to waive that secret with respect to any action or inquiry that
may arise out of the transactions.
B. Waiver by Conduct
Under the waiver by conduct approach, foreign investors and institutions
would waive the protections of secrecy laws - at least to the extent that
such protections may be waived by private parties - as a precondition of
engaging in a securities transaction in the U.S. Such waivers could be
implied from the fact that the transaction took place in the U.S. markets.
The U.S. could require that foreign investors make a clear and explicit
choice - either forego the investment opportunities available in the U.S. or
give up the protection of secrecy laws that might be used to conceal the
identity of the investor and the circumstances of the transaction.
Swiss law recognizes the concept of "acquiescence by conduct." Without
analyzing that doctrine, the term suggests that there may well be a basis
under Swiss law for recognizing an explicit intention of an investor to waive
3 Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 920 (1960),
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1878), see also Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French et al., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1856).
'CHess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
"MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 3A (West 1969).
4'See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 938 (1977);
Straub v. Vaisman, 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Limited, 473
F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326
(2d Cir. 1972); Fontaine v. S.E.C., 259 F. Supp. 880 (D. P.R. 1966); S.E.C. v. Gulf Interconti-
nental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1) (alternative provisions for service in a foreign country).
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applicable secrecy provisions in order to obtain the benefits of the U.S.
markets. This approach would respect the sovereignty and laws of all
nations that have secrecy laws. It would involve no extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. law. However, where the investor is the master of the secret,
and voluntarily chooses to waive otherwise applicable protections in order
to take advantage of investment opportunities in the U.S. markets, a major
obstacle to completion of the commission's investigations would be
removed.
The commission respects the existence of secrecy and blocking statutes
and the right of all nations to regulate transactions that occur within their
territory. However, it cannot reasonably be expected that the protections of
secrecy laws will follow the investor who decides to purchase or sell securi-
ties in another nation. It cannot be expected that the secrecy laws of other
nations will be given extraterritorial application with respect to transactions
that occur within the U.S. or any nation. All should recognize this princi-
ple: the act of engaging in a securities transaction outside a secrecy jurisdic-
tion is conduct that is fundamentally inconsistent with the continued
existence of the investor's "secret." The problem of holding foreign inves-
tors accountable is a problem for all nations with active securities markets
and the approach I am suggesting should serve the interests of all those
nations.
C. Questions for Congress
On May 24, 1983, I testified before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. I
posed the following questions for that subcommittee to consider during its
deliberations concerning possible legislation to assist the commission's
enforcement efforts. First, does the commission need legislation that will
put all persons on notice, and provide by operation of law, that the act of
effecting a securities transaction in the U.S. constitutes a waiver of any
secrecy provisions that a person or an agent may waive? Second, does the
commission need improved means for obtaining the assistance of a U.S.
district court, during an investigation, in requesting and obtaining informa-
tion from persons or institutions located overseas? Third, would it be help-
ful if legislation were enacted providing that the act of effecting a securities
transaction in the U.S. shall constitute the appointment of the U.S. broker-
dealer used as an agent for service of process with respect to any commis-
sion enforcement action or any statutory action that might be initiated to
assist the commission in seeking information in the course of its investiga-
tions? Fourth, to further eliminate problems in conducting investigations
and prosecuting enforcement actions, should legislation be enacted provid-
ing that the act of effecting a securities transaction in the U.S. shall consti-
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tute an explicit consent to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts with respect to
any action that might arise out of the transaction?
The commission has not suggested answers to those questions and has
not proposed legislation. This is a period of reflection on how the commis-
sion will police the internationalized securities markets for the balance of
this century - particularly in light of foreign laws restricting discovery.
VI. Conclusion
Protecting investors and maintaining the integrity of the U.S. capital
markets requires vigorous enforcement of the securities laws. With
increased foreign transactions taking place in the U.S., the commission
must have adequate enforcement tools to protect the U.S. markets. The
commission is committed to sending a message to all who participate in the
U.S. securities markets: "We welcome your participation, but you cannot
expect preferential treatment. If you want to trade in our. markets, you
must agree to play by the rules that apply to all participants in the market."
This maxim is not simply a declaration of U.S. interests. All nations with
securities markets must find ways to protect the integrity of their markets -
and the interests embodied in their laws - from incursions by persons who
cloak their activities behind secrecy laws. The principle that a nation's
secrecy laws should not apply to transactions effected outside its territory
would help all nations protect their sovereignty and vindicate their interests
in law enforcement.
The growing internationalization of the world's securities markets will
require workable solutions to the problems I have posed. The waiver by
conduct approach is one approach which could alleviate the problem and
complement the 1977 Treaty and the 1982 MOU. It would respect the sov-
ereignty of nations with secrecy laws and provide a basis for improved
nation-to-nation enforcement cooperation.
Other approaches may also provide workable solutions. It may be time
for a conference of law enforcement officials from the nations with securi-
ties markets and those with banking and secrecy laws to search for neutral
principles for policing the growing internationalization of the world's secur-
ities markets. No conference will easily solve all problems of competing
national interests. However, in order to preserve the integrity of the world's
securities markets it may be time that all involved nations identify the areas
of common interest and seek solutions of mutual respect. It is important
that we begin the task of identifying viable alternatives and considering
their merits in a spirit of mutual law enforcement cooperation.
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